The second panel brought together senior NATO commanders responsible for national-level deterrence headquarters, to share perspectives on how deterrence is applied across the continuum of competition. They examined the different models employed by Allies, the operational challenges of sustaining credible deterrence and the ways in which national approaches converge to strengthen NATO’s collective posture.
Panellists: Lt. Gen. Piotr Blazeusz, Brig. Gen. Jason Adair, Brig. Gen. Brian Jeffery, Com. Andrew Ainsley, and Mr. James Black
Key Takeaways:
- NATO is already operating in a state of sustained, below-threshold conflict.
The security environment has shifted from competition to continuous crisis, marked by cyber-attacks, cognitive warfare, EM-spectrum interference, sabotage, and Arctic pressure. Adversaries escalate freely, exploiting time and risk advantages, while NATO remains too reactive. Deterrence now requires proactive shaping, persistent presence, and a willingness to accept operational risk.
- Modern deterrence depends on adaptive institutions and transformed C2, not technology alone.
Success stems from rapid learning, decentralised decision-making, and adaptation under uncertainty, as demonstrated on contemporary battlefields. NATO’s legacy C2 structures are too slow and hierarchical for multi-domain operations. Effective deterrence requires resilient, data-driven C2 that functions under degraded conditions, supports unity of purpose, and enable commanders to understand adversaries’ strategic thinking across all domains, including subsurface and space.
- Classification and data-governance reform are now critical operational requirements.
Over-classification and fragmented national caveats undermine situational awareness, delay decisions, and inhibit multinational training and integration. Without modern, share-by-design data frameworks and dynamic access controls, even cutting-edge technologies in cyber, space, and autonomy cannot be leveraged effectively. Data, not manpower, is becoming the decisive enabler.
- Accelerating technology demands institutional transformation, streamlined processes, and a new risk culture.
Defence procurement and organisational norms remain slow, risk-averse, and poorly aligned with innovation cycles. Smaller firms struggle to enter the defence ecosystem, and militaries remain hesitant to introduce novel capabilities into operations. Real transformation requires interoperable, modular systems; close integration with commercial ecosystems; operational experimentation; simplified authorities; and leadership willing to embrace risk.
- Credible multi-domain deterrence requires whole-of-society resilience and redefined homeland defence.
Critical infrastructure, including commercial, undersea, and space-based systems, is now integral to national security, making society more vulnerable than ever. Homeland and Arctic defence have become central challenges as activity by Russia and China intensifies across all domains. Sustaining deterrence requires forward-looking strategies, strengthened supply chains, societal preparedness, and rebuilding trust between political leaders, military institutions, and the individuals who ultimately bear legal and moral responsibility for decisions.
Summary of the panel discussion:
This session examined modern military command challenges in the context of rising threats, hybrid conflict, and rapid technological change. The discussion highlighted the limitations of the traditional notion of “peacetime competition,” noting that in several domains, particularly cyber and cognitive information warfare, parts of NATO are already experiencing attacks that fall below the threshold of kinetic warfare. Russia was described as escalating while NATO responses remain largely reactive.
The conversation emphasized the urgent need for adaptation. Key challenges identified include outdated authorities, risk-averse cultures, slow processes, overly centralized decision-making, and legacy mindsets that prioritize bureaucracy over initiative. The Ukrainian model of rapid battlefield adaptation was cited as a relevant example.
The discussion also stressed the importance of multi-domain command and control, autonomous systems, persistent presence, enhanced domain awareness, and coalition interoperability. A critical concern raised was the gap between political willingness to accept risk and the reality that legal or operational consequences typically fall on the troops rather than decision-makers.
Overall, the session highlighted the tension between values, risk, and the need for proactive, disciplined initiative in an era where threats increasingly emerge below the threshold of declared war.
