Over 250 participants from 29 different nations gathered at the Rotterdam World Trade Centre from Monday, November 17, to Thursday, November 20, for the annual NATO C2 COE Conference: ‘Command & Control in the Digital Age: Accelerating NATO C2 Transformation to Deter in the Continuum of Competition’.
During the event six moderated panel discussions were held, engaging senior military leaders, captains of industry, scientists other subject matter experts and enthusiastic attendees.
Below the output of these six discussion panels is presented, based on the narrative of the conference. Per panel, key takeaways are derived from these discussions, taking into account the various questions, answers, statements and comments provided during these sessions.
The first panel set the scene by examining how adversaries attack today, from hybrid operations to cyber strikes. Experts on Russian modus operandi, alongside voices from industry and government, outlined the facts of current attacks, exposing the tools, tactics and patterns shaping today’s threat landscape.
Panellists: Mrs. Ivana Stradner, Ms. Patti Morrissey, Lt. Gen. Hubert Cottereau, and Mr. Dave Maasland
Key Takeaways:
- Cyber and information operations constitute an active battlespace in a protracted hybrid war
Russia is already conducting continuous, coordinated campaigns across cyber, physical, and cognitive domains, blending state agencies, criminal networks, and proxies. Infrastructure sabotage, influence activities, and advanced cyber strikes are designed to weaken Western societies without triggering open conflict.
- Russian strategy is offensive, integrated, and counter-value, targeting what the West depends on most
The adversary employs a whole-of-government doctrine built on reflexive control, plausible deniability, and attacks on logistics, energy, communications, and societal confidence. The aim is to reshape the global order while staying below formal thresholds. This integrated, multi-domain approach contrasts sharply with the West’s defensive posture.
- Western vulnerability stems from structural asymmetry, fragile infrastructure, and lack of strategic imagination
Western systems rely heavily on digitization and efficiency, which makes their critical infrastructure easier to target with fast, scalable operational-technology and cyber attacks. At the same time, legal constraints, fragmented decision making, and compliance-driven organizational cultures slow Western institutions and prevent them from keeping pace with adversary innovation. The key deficit is not information but imaginative leadership capable of translating knowledge into timely, threat-informed action.
- Hybrid and cognitive warfare is cumulative, not episodic, requiring detection of patterns over time
Adversaries generate effects across multiple domains by interfering in election, manipulating social narratives, probing of defences, and carrying out coordinated acts of sabotage. Defensive exposure alone is insufficient; counter-influence, strategic communication, and willingness to impose dilemmas are essential to disrupt hostile campaigns and regain initiative.
- Resilience requires whole-of-society mobilisation: integrated civil–military action, responsible industry, and digital literacy
Effective deterrence depends on operationalising multi-domain coordination, strengthening public–private cooperation, and protecting key technologies. Private industry must treat cyber resilience as a strategic responsibility, while societies require broad digital literacy to withstand manipulation. Without societal, technical, cognitive, and organizational resilience, both democracy and national security remain at risk.
Summary of the panel discussion:
The session explored how Russia is waging ongoing, largely non-kinetic warfare against the West, especially through cyber operations and cognitive/information campaigns. Speakers argued that many Western political, military, and corporate leaders lack knowledge on the real capabilities of cyber and hybrid tools, leading to underestimation of risk and slow adaptation.
In cyber, Russia has moved from poorly coordinated efforts to highly coordinated campaigns involving state services, cybercrime groups, and “hacktivist” proxies. They increasingly share tools, use expensive zero-day vulnerabilities, and have dramatically reduced preparation time, from months to weeks, for major attacks on operational technology and energy infrastructure. Western critical infrastructure is described as not ready for the scale and speed of such attacks, while societies keep adding sensors and automation built for efficiency rather than resilience.
The discussion framed Russian strategy as full-spectrum, long-duration warfare using orchestrated actions across cyber, physical infrastructure, information, and politics to create a “death by a thousand cuts.” Examples included undersea cable attacks, drone probing of borders, and election interference. The difficulty lies in attribution, measuring cumulative effects, and “connecting the dots” across time and domains. Participants argued that simply exposing hostile activities is insufficient; more offensive influence operations may be needed to put Russia on the defensive cognitively and politically.
Speakers also stressed that private industry and civil society are on the front line. Cyber is not just a technical or private-sector problem but a national security issue. Companies should move beyond superficial corporate social responsibility toward becoming “deeply responsible businesses,” building resilience into strategy, products, and infrastructure, and cooperating closely across sectors. Finally, the panel warned that without serious investment in digital literacy for adults and children alike, societies may harden systems but still fail to protect democracy from manipulation and division.
The second panel brought together senior NATO commanders responsible for national-level deterrence headquarters, to share perspectives on how deterrence is applied across the continuum of competition. They examined the different models employed by Allies, the operational challenges of sustaining credible deterrence and the ways in which national approaches converge to strengthen NATO’s collective posture.
Panellists: Lt. Gen. Piotr Blazeusz, Brig. Gen. Jason Adair, Brig. Gen. Brian Jeffery, Com. Andrew Ainsley, and Mr. James Black
Key Takeaways:
- NATO is already operating in a state of sustained, below-threshold conflict.
The security environment has shifted from competition to continuous crisis, marked by cyber-attacks, cognitive warfare, EM-spectrum interference, sabotage, and Arctic pressure. Adversaries escalate freely, exploiting time and risk advantages, while NATO remains too reactive. Deterrence now requires proactive shaping, persistent presence, and a willingness to accept operational risk.
- Modern deterrence depends on adaptive institutions and transformed C2, not technology alone.
Success stems from rapid learning, decentralised decision-making, and adaptation under uncertainty, as demonstrated on contemporary battlefields. NATO’s legacy C2 structures are too slow and hierarchical for multi-domain operations. Effective deterrence requires resilient, data-driven C2 that functions under degraded conditions, supports unity of purpose, and enable commanders to understand adversaries’ strategic thinking across all domains, including subsurface and space.
- Classification and data-governance reform are now critical operational requirements.
Over-classification and fragmented national caveats undermine situational awareness, delay decisions, and inhibit multinational training and integration. Without modern, share-by-design data frameworks and dynamic access controls, even cutting-edge technologies in cyber, space, and autonomy cannot be leveraged effectively. Data, not manpower, is becoming the decisive enabler.
- Accelerating technology demands institutional transformation, streamlined processes, and a new risk culture.
Defence procurement and organisational norms remain slow, risk-averse, and poorly aligned with innovation cycles. Smaller firms struggle to enter the defence ecosystem, and militaries remain hesitant to introduce novel capabilities into operations. Real transformation requires interoperable, modular systems; close integration with commercial ecosystems; operational experimentation; simplified authorities; and leadership willing to embrace risk.
- Credible multi-domain deterrence requires whole-of-society resilience and redefined homeland defence.
Critical infrastructure, including commercial, undersea, and space-based systems, is now integral to national security, making society more vulnerable than ever. Homeland and Arctic defence have become central challenges as activity by Russia and China intensifies across all domains. Sustaining deterrence requires forward-looking strategies, strengthened supply chains, societal preparedness, and rebuilding trust between political leaders, military institutions, and the individuals who ultimately bear legal and moral responsibility for decisions.
Summary of the panel discussion:
This session examined modern military command challenges in the context of rising threats, hybrid conflict, and rapid technological change. The discussion highlighted the limitations of the traditional notion of “peacetime competition,” noting that in several domains, particularly cyber and cognitive information warfare, parts of NATO are already experiencing attacks that fall below the threshold of kinetic warfare. Russia was described as escalating while NATO responses remain largely reactive.
The conversation emphasized the urgent need for adaptation. Key challenges identified include outdated authorities, risk-averse cultures, slow processes, overly centralized decision-making, and legacy mindsets that prioritize bureaucracy over initiative. The Ukrainian model of rapid battlefield adaptation was cited as a relevant example.
The discussion also stressed the importance of multi-domain command and control, autonomous systems, persistent presence, enhanced domain awareness, and coalition interoperability. A critical concern raised was the gap between political willingness to accept risk and the reality that legal or operational consequences typically fall on the troops rather than decision-makers.
Overall, the session highlighted the tension between values, risk, and the need for proactive, disciplined initiative in an era where threats increasingly emerge below the threshold of declared war.
The third panel explored how NATO is redefining critical infrastructure and why the military’s role in its protection is expanding. It examined the evolving threat landscape, the vulnerabilities of vital national assets and the importance of collaboration across military, government, academia and industry. The discussion highlighted why critical infrastructure has become a strategic target and how collective resilience can be strengthened in this new threat era.
Panellists: Maj. Gen. Wilfred Rietdijk, Brig. Gen. Miguel Guil, Mr. Martin Slijkhuis, and Mr. John-Mikal Størdal
Key Takeaways:
- Critical infrastructure is a deeply interdependent, hybrid vulnerability with unclear ownership.
Infrastructure such as ports, energy networks, railways and telecommunications is embedded in complex civil–military systems that adversaries actively study and exploit. Yet no single actor can legally or practically protect it: companies are restricted, militaries lack authority, and responsibilities are fragmented across national, alliance and private sectors.
- Protection and resilience require multinational, cross-sector governance.
Since much infrastructure is multinational and underpins alliance-wide military mobility, national efforts alone are inadequate. Experiences when coordinating major security events show that effective protection demands integrated action across NATO, the EU, emergency services, industry, telecom providers and government agencies, supported by trust and clarity of roles.
- Technological innovation and selective offensive capability are essential but not sufficient.
Emerging technologies such as cyber, data, ISR and space are critical for understanding, defending and, when required, targeting critical systems. However, technology only works when paired with sound concepts, hybrid command posts, and the ability to process and act on vast amounts of information in fast-moving threat environments.
- Human factors and cognitive diversity are central to solving complex security challenges.
Resilience depends on leadership, mindset, skillsets and the ability to work across cultures, disciplines and legal frameworks. Diverse perspectives from scientists, psychologists, social scientists, industry experts and other civilian specialists improve foresight, decision-making and understanding of hybrid threats, including the grey zone between peace and war.
- Future readiness requires foresight, imagination and broader societal engagement.
Scientific trend analysis, wargaming and expanding participation in research communities help anticipate long-term challenges. At the same time, progress is often limited by cultural inertia rather than political will. Harnessing the interest and energy of younger generations, and cultivating more creative, adaptable thinking across NATO and its partners, are essential to strengthening collective resilience.
Summary of the panel discussion:
The discussion focused on the future of defence, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the evolving relationship between technology, society, and military power. Speakers emphasize that while technology is essential for maintaining an edge, it must be integrated with strong human expertise, diverse perspectives, and organizational adaptability. Critical infrastructure such as ports, energy systems, transportation networks, and digital networks has become a strategic vulnerability in hybrid conflict, yet responsibility for protecting it is often unclear or constrained by legal and bureaucratic barriers.
There is a strong call to broaden cooperation across military, civilian, academic, industrial, and technological communities, recognizing that solutions emerge from cognitive diversity and cross-sector collaboration. The complexity of modern conflicts requires new command-and-control approaches that rely less on strict hierarchy and more on trust, shared understanding, and the ability to work with capabilities not directly under military authority.
Cultural and leadership transformation is needed, emphasizing on imagination, humility, and narratives that can effectively mobilize political and industrial support. The discussion highlighted the importance of learning from recent conflicts, challenging simplistic ideas like decisive battles, and preparing for sustained, systemic competition rather than pursuing short-term, technology-driven wins.
The fourth panel explored the necessity of accelerating NATO’s interoperability within the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept. Success requires synchronising efforts not only among Allies but also with civil entities and non-military actors, including global industry, the defence sector and academia. Senior leaders discussed how to align innovation, technology and operational concepts across these domains, ensuring that NATO can act as one in the face of complex and rapidly evolving threats.
Panellists: Mrs. Wendy Gilmour, Brig Gen. Robbie Boyd, Mr. Ben Crampton, and Mr. Paolo Pezzola
Key Takeaways:
- Accelerated, effect-driven innovation is essential, with Ukraine providing the leading model.
Rapid capability development depends on tight, continuous collaboration between military operators, government structures, industry and academia. Ukraine’s example of using real-time data integration and agile co-development demonstrates how operational effects, not processes, must drive innovation. - NATO’s current acquisition culture and processes are too slow for modern conflict.
Risk-averse and linear procurement systems that are characterised by rigid requirements, lengthy cycles, and prioritisation of procedural safety over battlefield relevance cannot meet the tempo required for MDO. Faster, more adaptive pathways and a shift in mindset toward calculated risk are urgently required. - Interoperability and resilience hinge on multinational digital infrastructure and open architectures.
Modern operations rely less on hardware and more on software, data systems and cloud networks, many of which are inherently multinational. Outdated sovereignty rules, restrictive legislation, and complex classification practices pose the primary obstacles to interoperability, data mobility and resilience. - Cultural and institutional barriers across nations remain the biggest impediment to progress.
Peacetime mindsets, siloed organisational structures, distrust among allies, and reluctance to embrace new models of collaboration between military, industry and academia slow innovation more than any technological gap. Commanders must set requirements that demand interoperability and multi-domain integration. - Financial systems are emerging as critical enablers of defence capability and innovation.
Banks and investors increasingly recognise that geopolitical instability threatens economic stability, opening opportunities for new financial mechanisms to accelerate capability development. At the same time, safeguarding critical technologies from hostile acquisition is essential. Multi-domain defence efforts will increasingly require coordinated engagement among military actors, governments, industry and the financial sector.
Summary of the panel discussion:
The session explored how democratic nations, alliances and industry must fundamentally change the way they cooperate in response to the war against Russia, using Ukraine’s experience as a model of rapid, integrated innovation. Ukraine showed that effective capability development depends on continuous collaboration between military operators, government and industry rather than slow, linear procurement cycles. Many NATO countries still prioritise procedure, cost control and risk avoidance over speed and adaptability, leaving them ill-equipped to respond to fast-changing threats.
A central theme was the need to rethink digital infrastructure and data policy. Modern cloud systems operate across borders, making purely national approaches to resilience unrealistic. Wartime demands for data storage and processing far exceed peacetime capacity, and restrictive sovereignty rules often undermine resilience rather than protect it. Interoperability has shifted from a hardware challenge to a software and legislative one, requiring updated laws, regular testing and more flexible approaches to data mobility.
Finance emerged as a critical enabler. Banks and investors increasingly recognise that geopolitical instability threatens economic stability, and new financial tools could accelerate defence innovation more effectively than traditional budgets. At the same time, participants warned about the risk of hostile acquisitions of critical technologies and called for stronger security oversight in financial markets.
The role of military leaders is evolving: commanders must now engage not only with operational issues but also with industry, infrastructure providers and financial institutions, shaping the broader ecosystem that underpins military capability. Ultimately, the session concluded that culture is the primary barrier. Institutions continue to operate with peacetime mindsets, slowing decision-making and limiting cooperation. To meet current and future threats, nations must adopt the urgency seen in Ukraine, break down institutional silos, modernise procurement and finance, embrace multinational digital infrastructure and foster leaders capable of operating across operational, technological and economic domains.
The fifth panel explored the cultural change required to maintain NATO’s decision advantage in a MDO environment. In a hybrid battlespace where collaboration is essential, leaders must adapt to work seamlessly with other instruments of power and new partners such as industry. The abundance of information offers opportunities for informed decision-making and human–machine teaming, but only if leadership culture evolves to embrace openness, agility and trust. Perspectives from NATO leadership, academia, defence education, and industry will highlight how to accelerate this cultural shift and prepare future leaders for effective command in a complex decision environment.
Panellists: CSEL CWO Mark Veraart, Mr. Henrik Sommer, Mr. Uwe Kutzki, and Dr. Thomas Crosbie
Key Takeaways:
- Leadership fundamentals endure, but their application must evolve. Modern leaders must be flexible, practical, and able to mentor subordinates in real-world situations, not just rely on theory.
- The battlefield is multi-domain and cognitively demanding. Effective performance now requires continuous learning, technological literacy, and an understanding of complex, interconnected operating environments.
- Modern leadership emphasizes inclusivity, trust, and communication. Explaining the purpose behind decisions, empowering subordinates, and cultivating accountability are essential to motivating today’s soldiers.
- Training and education need significant reform. Forces must break down organizational silos, incorporate experimentation, integrate emerging technologies, and redesign professional military education to prepare personnel for multi-domain collaboration.
- Human capability remains the decisive advantage. While advanced technology and AI are increasingly important, adaptability, character, teamwork, and trust are the true determinants of success.
Summary of the panel discussion:
Military leadership and culture must adapt to a complex, multi-domain battlefield while preserving core values. Leadership fundamentals are seen as timeless, but their application must be flexible and practical. Effective leaders are expected to assume command, mentor juniors, and build character through everyday actions, not abstract theory alone.
Modern operations extend across land, air, sea, cyber, and space, as well as the less visible cognitive and information domains. This environment demands continuous learning, strong judgment, and a deep understanding of current and future warfare. Soldiers with discipline, fighting spirit, and an unwavering drive for mission success, whether on the front lines or operating drones remotely, remain essential. Leadership is framed as transformational and inclusive, based on trust, empowerment, clear communication, and explaining the purpose behind decisions.
The discussion addressed culture, education, technology, and trust, highlighting generational differences, the impact of advanced technologies such as AI, and the shift from map-centric, manual processes to data-centric, automated approaches. Professional military education was identified as a key lever for change but in need of overhaul to address MDO, especially cooperation with non-military actors. Trust between people, across nations, and in machines is both essential and difficult, and something that can only be built through realistic experimentation, transparent use of technology, and a sustained focus on developing people as the decisive element in warfare.
The sixth panel explored what nations must do today to enable the digital transformation of military organisations and governments to keep pace with the speed of innovation in industry. It addressed practical challenges such as enabling secure data sharing across nations, actors and platforms; accelerating the integration of AI in decision-making and harnessing industry leadership for cross-Atlantic collaboration and innovation. Using Ukraine’s pioneering experience in government and military digital transformation as a reference point, panellists discussed lessons for NATO Allies and identified actionable solutions for achieving decision advantage through digital transformation.
Panellists: Mr. Nathan Pearce, Mr. Kaspar Gubi Petersen, Mrs. Kateryna Bondar, and Mr. Sebastiaan van ‘t Erve
Key Takeaways:
- Digital transformation is a survival requirement driven by modern warfare’s pace.
Contemporary conflict evolves through rapid, iterative innovation cycles, making fast digital adaptation in C2 essential. Systems need to be regularly maintained and updated, and nations that cannot adapt at this tempo risk losing operational advantage. - Momentum is hindered by long-term visions, rigid systems, and slow procurement.
Overemphasis on future architectures, complex approval processes, and legacy mindsets prevents the adoption of effective tools already available today. Simplified, off-the-shelf solutions and mission-risk–based sharing approaches are underused despite being viable now. - Transformation depends on leadership, culture, and trust, not only technology.
Open modular systems, real-time experimentation, and data-enabled tools can only succeed when supported by decisive leadership, pragmatic organisational cultures, and trusted relationships across defence, government, industry, and civil sectors. Classification rules, legal frameworks, and procurement models must evolve to match the urgency. - National leadership drives implementation, with coalitions advancing faster than the whole.
Differences in sovereignty, priorities, and digital maturity mean transformation cannot progress uniformly across the Alliance. Real progress is occurring where nations form coalitions of the willing, undertake joint exercises, and build operational networks that demonstrate what is possible when decisions are made quickly. - Digital resilience is a whole-society challenge requiring coordinated orchestration.
NATO’s most effective role is to set standards, facilitate interoperability, and create conditions for collaboration, while nations implement capabilities and invest in resilience across both military and civilian infrastructures. Achieving decision advantage demands immediate action, simplified processes, and pragmatic cooperation rather than waiting for crisis conditions to force change.
Summary of the panel discussion:
Modern conflict now demands rapid digital adaptation, especially in C2, where software, autonomous systems, and data-driven decisions must evolve almost daily. Long procurement cycles, rigid architectures, and traditional structures cannot keep pace. Instead, defence organizations need an innovation ecosystem that continuously connects frontline experience, industry, developers, and headquarters so that lessons quickly turn into updated capabilities and operational advantage.
Open modular architectures, real-time experimentation, and a culture that allows commanders to fully exploit new technologies are a must. There is a need for faster acquisition processes, clearer rules for using and sharing data, and digital infrastructure that can absorb emerging tools. Across the discussion, there was a strong frustration about the gap between ambitious strategies and slow practical change, as well as about fragmented standards, legal constraints, and weak trust between nations, institutions, and industry.
Participants stressed that this is not just a military issue but a societal resilience problem, given growing attacks on civil infrastructure. Real progress hinges on leadership willing to make bold, timely decisions; simplify and accelerate cooperation; and build coalitions of actors who can act pragmatically and share responsibility, rather than waiting for a future crisis to force change.
